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Abstract
Tax incentives in favour of public utility in
Switzerland, while they are subject to some debate in
terms of amounts or rates, are generally not
discussed as a public policy tool. This article, based
on the literature on tax incentives for public
purposes, would like to shed light on the issues at
stake. To do this, we will first consider tax incentives
for public purposes as a public policy tool, before
examining the stakes of such a tool, in the light of
public policy literature and political philosophy, but
also from the point of view of political authorities,
based on the Swiss case. We will see that, beyond
these debates, many interventions - whether by
interest groups, lawyers or parliamentarians - are
promoting this tool. The question of reform
proposals in this area will then be asked to see how
far the concerns of political actors are from the
reflections of economists, politicians and
philosophers who have addressed these issues.
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Introduction: Tax incentives as a public
policy tool
 
 Tax options, as with preferred tax instruments  [1], are
carriers of political, economic and social choices,
which refer to different conceptions of social justice,
redistribution and efficiency  [2]. Offering the
possibility to avoid taxes is in this way a public policy
tool [3].
 
Through fiscal tools, governments financial
incentivize individuals to engage in a particular code
of conduct  [4]; they provide financial incentives to
attain specific political objectives.
 
Taxation is a tool amongst others, meaning
governments can act in different ways: at times they
resort to direct spending programs (for example,
State social policies or subsidies to organizations), at
others to special taxation arrangements. In the same
way, fiscal expenditures can come in different forms:
tax breaks, special exclusions from income,
deductions, tax credits, tax deferrals, preferential tax
rates, etc.
Tax incentives in favour
of public utility in
Switzerland: an
incomplete debate?
sexuelles (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2019).
 
Caroline Honegger   is a researcher at  HES-SO, Haute
école de travail social et de la santé (EESP) in
Lausanne. She has a Masters in development studies
from the  ’Institut des hautes études internationales et
du développement (IHEID) in Geneva.
L'Année PhiLanthropique - The PhiLanthropic Year                                                                                                          Volume 1 - Avril | April 2019
32
the implementation of projects is delegated to the
private sphere instead of to the government - such
as the case with charitable donations: the deduction
for charitable donations is, in fact, a government
program of gift matching to encourage charitable
donations, but the choice of the organizations who
will benefit is left to the individual donor. Finally, 8)
this brings into play other institutions and actors of
public policy than for direct spending: the program
will be elaborated and administered by those whose
main expertise is not in the field concerned by the
action. “Les fonctionnaires [de l’administration fiscale]
sont formés pour être des experts en droit et des
percepteurs d'impôts ; ils ne sont pas des experts
formés dans les programmes environnementaux, le
logement, les économies d'énergie et tous les autres
domaines de la vie sociale et économique dans lesquels
les programmes de dépenses fiscales ont été
introduits” [8]. In this way, in the case of public utility,
its definition tends to be brought up from a taxation
angle instead of from the angle of knowing if the
programs promoted by organizations would be
accepted if they were to be financed through direct
subsidies.
 
 
 
Largely trivialized today, the use of tax exemptions
for public purposes is far from being universal or
timeless. This can be seen by comparing national
contexts, and limiting ourselves to the question of
charitable donations and public utility organizations,
the frameworks, incentives as well as the controls
vary greatly from one country to the next. It can even
be said that what was once considered as public
utility has evolved throughout the decades.
 
The European Foundation Center’s report [9], which
determines   the   different   categories  of  objectives
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These choices have an impact on the implementation
of the policy, as well as on the actors, within
administrations, who accompany these policies: as
Salamon reminds us, “What makes the use of
different instruments so significant is that each
instrument has its own distinctive procedures, its
own network or organizational relationships, its own
skill requirements - in short, its own ‘political
economy’”  [5]. The author also states that “ the
central reality of many of the newer tools of
government action is that they vest a major share-
perhaps even the lion’s share- of the discretionary
authority involved in the operation of public
programs into the hands of one or another non-
federal, often non-public, third-party
implementer” [6].
 
There are many reasons that could favour the use of
tax exemptions as a public policy tool. McDaniel  [7]
lists a number of arguments: 1) First off, this could
give the impression that no public expenditure is
actually involved, as there is no direct expenditure; 2)
second, this type of policy seems to be of great
simplicity, not seeming to require any governmental
bureaucracy for its implementation; 3) also, this tool
has the advantage that the program’s beneficiaries
don’t psychologically feel that they are the
beneficiaries of public subsidies; 4) or even, this tool
allows for an easier political process as it is exposed
to less opposition than direct expenditures. 5)
Finally, a program adopted in the form of a tax
expenditure is generally considered to have less
political visibility than a comparable direct spending
program. Those who benefit from tax expenditure
programs can see an advantage as direct spending
programs tend to be the objects of regular and more
in-depth examinations.
 
Simultaneously, and beyond these few elements,
three points mark important changes in the political
economy of such a tool in comparison to direct
spending: first, 6) in terms of priorities regarding
expenditures. Every tax expenditure automatically
has first priority over all direct expenditure programs
(as the budget available to Parliament is the product
of tax collection) - which means that the abundance
of charitable donations has a priority over the direct
financing of other sectors (such as education, the
army, agriculture). Next, 7)  the  decision  process  for
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Tax incentives: local and temporal variations
It can even be said that
what was once considered
as public utility has
evolved throughout the
decades.
that are accepted for the recognition of public utility,
which gives the right to exemptions  [10], shows a
significant heterogeneity between European
countries regarding the definition of these
objectives. Certain countries, such as Malta or
Bulgaria are very restrictive, whereas other countries
such as Austria or Switzerland appear to be very
open.
 
In the same way, if regulatory and taxation
frameworks have become more liberal in the majority
of European countries in the last decades [11], there
are still great variations in terms of exemptions
according to these same countries. In France, the tax
bureau reimburses 66% of the donation the following
year (sometimes up to 75% for some donations)
through a tax credit, up to a limit of 20% of the
donor’s taxable income. Sweden, and to limit
ourselves to the Direct Federal Tax (DFT), allows for
donors, as of the amount of 100.-, to deduct
donations from their taxable income, also up to 20%
of their income. However, this 20% limit is not
universal. It is 2% in Croatia, 4% in Ukraine, 25% in
Russia and 100% in Cyprus. If these countries chose
as a maximum amount open to an exemption to be a
percentage of taxable income, others, on the
contrary, have chosen nominal amounts or a
combination of percentage and nominal amounts. In
Belgium, monetary donations of over 40 euros are
deductible up to 10% of taxable income, but with a
maximum of 380 550 euros. In Denmark, donations
over 70 euros are deductible, but  up to a maximum
of 1950 euros. In Sweden, the income tax of
individuals can be reduced by 160 euros at most if
the donor makes a donation of 640 euros to
organizations in the social State or science sectors.
Of course, some countries have no financial
incentives. Such is the case in Serbia and Finland.
Even on Switzerland’s level, there are significant
variations. Inter-cantonal differences concern the
maximum amount allowed for exemption (ranging
from 5% of income in Neuchâtel to 100% in Bâle-
Campagne), and the limitation or not for foundations
to conduct their activities outside of their canton or
of Switzerland itself. Furthermore, if certain cantons
only consider donations over 100.-, others, in
contrast, have no limit regarding the minimum
amount of a donation. Differences also concern the
flexibility given to cantonal fiscal authorities, while
some cantons have strict limits regarding the
maximum percentage of taxable income eligible for
exemptions, others give cantonal authorities the
possibility to increase the percentage on a case by
case basis [12].
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, these legal frameworks have continued to
evolve over the past decades, be it on the European
level (Italian reform of banking foundations in 1990,
Austrian law on private foundations in 1993, Spanish
law on foundations in 1994, or even the Swedish law
on foundations in 1996) or on the Swiss level (the last
revision of the Law of Foundations implemented on
January 1st, 2006, see note [13] ). On a longer time
scale, Switzerland has also witnessed an evolution
regarding the notion of public utility; the first half of
the 20th century following a restrictive conception of
“public utility” activities. This limited exemptions to
charitable or altruistic institutions whose objectives
were to help others, be them needy, sick, or very
old[1]. It is only later that, other than when physically
coming in aid to individuals, altruism will be invoked
for humanitarian aid, science, or social and cultural
causes for example. The notion of altruism was then
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of the action, but by the way
in which the public utility
activity is carried out.
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transformed, no longer being defined by
the  characteristics of the targets of the action, but by
the way in which the public utility activity is carried
out.
 
This latter could not be done to the benefit of the
directors, members or of their relatives. In the same
vein, a second evolution characterized the 20th
century regarding what public utility actions give the
right to tax exemptions. If fiscal authorities initially
considered “all activities that discharged the State of
one of its legally prescribed tasks” as being of public
utility, a disconnect between State affairs and public
utility would later appear. Today, what fits into
“public utility” is no longer limited to the tasks
legally prescribed by the State, but also: activities
that the State could engage in if they had the
means[14]. It is no longer a question of overlapping
public utility over public service, but on the contrary,
allowing for the independence of the first from the
second.
 
 
 
 
While tax incentive policies, be they applied to public
utility organizations or donations in their favour, are
undeniably successful to a certain extent, they are
also accompanied by much critique  [15]. The latter
cover what the literature coins as a double
“plutocratic bias”: since the exemption system in
favour of public utility organizations lowers taxable
income by the amount of the donation, the financial
benefit proportionally increases according to the
income - and tax- bracket - of the person. To limit
ourselves to the case of the DFT in Switzerland [16]:
a taxpayer living alone with a taxable income of
50’000 CHF will pay 444.95 francs in DFT per year.
If they make a donation of 5’000 CHF to public utility
organizations, their taxable income will be
considered to be only 45’000 CHF and will pay no
more than 312.94 CHF in DFT. Their donation of
5’000 CHF allows them to save 132.01 in taxes (or
only costs them 4867.01 CHF). If we now consider
the case of a taxpayer living alone with a taxable
income of 150’000 CHF per year and who makes the
same donation of 5’000 CHF, their taxable income
will go down to 145’000 CHF, and their gain will be
greater:   they   will   only   pay   6983,60  CHF  of DFT
instead of 7533.60 CHF. Their donation will then
allow them to save 550 CHF in taxes (or will only
cost them 4450 CHF)  [17]. For someone who has a
taxable income below 17’800 CHF, minimum income
at which one pays DFT, a donation of 5000 CHF
would not decrease their DFT. The cost of the
donation is thus 5000 CHF in such a case. The tax
system of indirect funding of public utility
organizations can then be considered as a
“regressive” system where the less wealthy pay,
through their direct or indirect taxes such as
the  TVA  [1] , to support the tax gap left by fiscal
expenditures in favour of the philanthropic choices of
the wealthier population.
 
The “plutocratic bias” is not only present in the fact
that the deduction mechanism favours the wealthy: it
can also be found in the choices of public utility
projects or organizations that are supported.
Reich[1] demonstrates - in the case of the United
States - that philanthropy is often considered as the
fact of caring for others - and that this argument
justifies the tax exemptions that are awarded today -
when in reality a very small portion of donations go
towards those in need. In reference to research by
Indiana University’s Center for Philanthropy in 2007,
he observes that only a small portion of donations
goes towards needy populations to meet their needs,
and that the wealthier the donors are, the less they
give to organizations whose objective is to come in
aid to the most impoverished.  In 2005, American
millionaires only dedicated 4% of their donations to
help the poor, preferring to fund culture, scientific
research and health; donors with less than 100 000
dollars of income, for their part,  dedicated  over  10%
[03] Dossier Spécial | Special Feature
A public policy tool that is the object of
numerous critiques (but of  few debates)
L'Année PhiLanthropique - The PhiLanthropic Year                                                                                                          Volume 1 - Avril | April 2019
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of their donations to help the poor. Reich states that
“philanthropy [for philanthropists] appears to be
more  about  the   pursuit   of  one’s   own   projects,  a
mechanism for the expression of one’s values or
preferences rather than a mechanism for
redistribution or relief for the poor” [19].
 
Proof of the social efficiency of tax deductions is
thus limited because fiscal incentives tend to not
only be regressive, but also to direct taxpayer dollars
towards expenditures favoured by the rich.
 
This statement also seems valid for Switzerland. In
listing the “significant individual donations of the
past few years”, AvenirSuisse  [20] shows how
scientific research and the construction and
expansion of museums or cultural institutions are the
main beneficiaries in terms of the distribution of
these donations. Out of the 17 significant donations
listed, 7 went to the creation of museums or other
prestigious cultural institutions and 8 went to
scientific research or to hospitals. Only 2 seem to
distinguish themselves from these categories; one
went to the construction of an emergency medical
service in the donor’s municipality, and the other to a
gym. Helping the poor is nowhere to be found.
 
A third critique, stemming less from a political
philosophy perspective and more from an economics
approach, focuses on the evaluation of the efficiency
of these incentives as public policies. Monnet and
Panizza  [21] show how while much research  [22]
(many of which have contradicting results) seek to
observe and measure, on the short, medium and long
term, the incentivizing dimension of tax deductions,
thanks to econometric techniques (by observing if a
tax    reduction    leads   to   an    equivalent    increase
in   charitable   donations),     the   question   of   social
efficiency is much harder  to  study.   It  is  thus  more
common to find it assumed rather than proven. In
fact, to be considered efficient, a charitable tax
deduction should lead to the creation of social goods
whose value is superior to the social goods that
would have been produced by the State with the
amount of lost taxes. To evaluate an optimal tax
structure from a social point of view, one would have
to estimate the social benefits of donations and
compare them to the social benefits of public
expenditures. The question then arises of the
problem of matching the foundations’ objectives with
the problems that public powers would support [23].
Do they match up? Or are they in contradiction to
the programs funded by the public powers? Monnet
and Panizza ask, with a certain irony: if someone who
is passionate about the well being of cats donates
1000 CHF to a foundation who takes care of
abandoned cats and after tax incentives, the
donation only costs them 750 CHF, the government’s
loss of collected taxes is 250 CHF; is we suppose that
these lost taxes could have been used to help orphan
children, how much more should society as a whole
care about the wellbeing of abandoned cats versus
the well being of orphan children for the tax
deduction to be considered efficient from a social
point of view?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These doubts regarding the efficiency of tax
incentives are also expressed by political authorities.
In Switzerland, the Federal audit office, in their
analysis of Swiss foundations, reminds us that “no
estimation is available on the effects of tax
exemptions for foundations or of all organizations
exempt from taxes themselves” [24] and that “we do
not have information on the economic impact of the
yearly distribution of 1.5 to 2 billion CHF that takes
place in Switzerland and abroad (by foundations
recognized as being of   public utility)”  [25] .   
Finally,  they note that “The more foundation
activities there are, the less public funds are
available (for example for education, culture, social
affairs, sports or environmental protection)” [26].
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The Federal Tax Administration (FTA) [27], on its
part, serves to remind that the OECD [28] proposes a
limitation of deduction possibilities. It regrets the
lack of interest concerning this issue  [29], but
emphasizes that in the few studies evaluating the
effects of tax concessions [30] , most of the time tax
relief is supposed to encourage the taxpayers to
engage in a determined behavior. However, the tax
benefits will above all display spin-off benefits,
meaning that expenditures that would have been
made are co-financed even if the tax liability was not
reduced.
 
Therefore, since the efficiency is not guaranteed,
Reich  [31] suggests another reason for tax
incentives. According to what he calls “pluralism
logic,” we can justify the favorable tax treatment of
philanthropic donations by the fact that tax subsidies
contribute to the creation of a “diverse,
decentralized and pluralistic voluntary sector,”  [32]
an essential prerequisite in a Tocquevillian
perspective to have a successfully operating liberal
democracy. As claimed by Reich, the true public good
supplied by philanthropic organizations may lie less
in the goals they are pursuing than in the associating
community life they are creating, and in the
possibility offered to citizens to “vote” for a project
of social action that they consider to be the most
directly efficient - without the mediation of political
institutions. While the State traditionally seeks to
satisfy the preferences of the median voter - which
can lead for example in terms of culture to only fund
relatively universal charities rather than counter-
cultures or alternative cultures, philanthropy would
ensure the pluralism. In this regard, it would be the
strength of the third sector and the pluralism in and
of themselves that would be considered the public
good.
 
It would surely be welcomed to promote pluralism.
However, for Cagé [33], we cannot talk of pluralism if
philanthropy reflects first and foremost, the
preferences of a small group of wealthy people. For
her, “Reich is right to emphasize that when you want
to satisfy the preferences of the median voter you
take the risk of funding only universal charities.
Nonetheless, sticking to a system where the State
responds to the preferences of the median voter is
not compulsory. On the contrary, we could offer each
citizen (…)   (rather than a handful of philanthropists)
the possibility of funding the art foundations of its
choosing.   It would ensure the representation of the
pluralism of citizens’ preferences, without resting on
the preferences expressed by a minority of wealthy
people.”  [34] Likewise, the argument that the
funding of philanthropists would foster pluralism
might be wrong. Reich wrote, “is it essential to fund
the practice of freedom to produce a vibrant civil
society? After all, there was no tax deduction for
charitable donations when Tocqueville did his tour in
the USA. (…) We can say without exaggeration that
the growth of non-profit organizations in the USA
and the use of charitable tax deductions coincide
with the decline in civic engagement in community
life, at least if we consider the literature inspired by
Robert Putnam. The existence of non-profit
organizations managed by professionals may have
contributed to the calcification of civil society.” [35]
The “pipeline” or “restraint” system of social
movements by the largest philanthropic foundations
have also been documented  [36]. If what matters
today for the third sector organizations is less the
number of volunteers than to raise enough funds to
operate, aren’t NGOs led to articulate their course of
action as well as their goals depending on the
preferences of the most privileged- those who
contribute financially [37]?
 
Moreover, in her publication, Cagé raises an
interesting question: is the system designed for
everyone    or  for  a  small  minority?   In  the  case  of
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election financing in France, her conclusions are
explicit. The system isn’t thought up so that each of
the 37 million households benefit from a public
contribution of 5,000 euros [here we’re talking about
the tax deduction currently offered to those who give
around the 7,500 euros ceiling to each political
party,] the total cost for the State would be of 165
billion euros. In Switzerland as well, increased
possible tax deduction from 10 to 20 % of the income
or net income as part of the Schiesser initiative
(implemented in 2006), only seems feasible because
it concerns a small minority of people. The Federal
Council has also reported that it is possible to
implement such a reform simply because “1 or 2 % of
the taxpayers would benefit from higher deductions
if the limitation on deductibility were to rise”, and
knowing that “tax revenue deduction (e.g., the
reduction of direct federal tax) (…) shouldn’t be
significant.” Inversely, in 2011 when the Streiff-Feller
motion (11.3083) offered a tax credit for the
expenses incurred by people during charitable work,
the Federal Council used a counter-argument to
reject this proposal. Although they conceded the
existence of an injustice, they estimated the
potential consequences- if every taxpayer asked for
such a tax credit- at “580 million Swiss francs just
for the direct federal tax, provided that all taxpayers
asked for the highest deduction offered (3,000
francs).”
 
The FTA  [38] holds the same position, when they
restated a message from the Federal Council dating
back to December 15th, 1986 in support of a bill on
financial aids and allowances; that the financial aids
in the form of tax breaks: a) violate the constitutional
principle of taxation based on economic capacity,
and thus, violate the tax fairness principle if they are
used   to   reach   non-fiscal  goals”;   b)  “restrict   the
authority’s influence on the activity to be promoted
because they cannot be attached to terms or
obligations”; c) “don’t allow for the evaluation of their
financial consequences. They thus escape from
forms of control, and in consequently, are not subject
to modifications and repeals, therefore, risking
without notice, to transform themselves over the
years into a truly undesirable scattering of
subsidies”; finally d) “the lack of reference to
subsidies in the form of tax cuts in the
Confederation’s books is contrary to the principles of
transparency” and “tax cuts are hidden subsidies
that remain largely unregulated by the parliament
budget-wise.”
 
This last point has been particularly present in the
speeches from Swiss authorities since the early 20s;
if they refuse to see tax reduction on income (or net
income) rate increase significantly, it is because they
primarily fear that “by allowing taxpayers to decide
the allocation of certain funds to specific tasks, it
might somehow delegate the budgetary power to
them [whereas it should be left to the
Parliament.]”  [39]
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Legislation of interest and parliamentary
reforms in Switzerland: For which
exemptions?
Despite the political authorities’ expressed
reluctance to change, the demands in favour of
reforms favouring philanthropy, be they from
interest groups, lawyers or parliamentarians, are
numerous.
 
First, the matter of interest groups, falling in line with
the European Center efforts that compare national
rights and aim at promoting more and more
liberalism  [40]. In Switzerland, we notice various
initiatives, parallel or combined to parliamentary
initiatives, that  seek to liberalize the Law of
Foundations or to foster accessibility to tax
exemptions. One example is the work done by
ProFonds (the Swiss umbrella association of non-
profit foundations and associations of all forms of
activity and financing) or the reports issued by
Fondation Lombard Odier in collaboration with
FSG  [41] or AvenirSuisse  [42]. In their report   Le
monde des  fondations  en  mouvement,  Idées  pour  un
38
“The option of allocating
significant donations spread
over several years, would
constitute a meaningful
reform in Swiss tax law...
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mécénat moderne, considers alongside the Luginbühl
initiative (see below), that “the option of allocating
significant donations spread over several years,
would constitute a meaningful reform in Swiss tax
law, as is already possible in Germany. Such a
measure would increase flexibility for donors.” [43]
 
On to the lawyer’s side, taking an interest in
foundations or philanthropy, law professionals,
mentioning the contribution capacity principle [44],
also offer various legislative reforms known as
“legislation of interest.” These reforms may address
the Law of Foundations and the requirements
opening the possibility of tax exemptions for
charitable purposes  [45] and more specifically on
the tax system [46]. Lawyers rarely question the tax
relief system itself; Mettrau claims that tax
exemption for charitable organizations must be
considered to follow tax fairness: “Tax fairness
justifies that we exempt an institution working
towards the same goal as the community collecting
the tax. If collecting funds is a State duty that will
enable it to carry out its tasks, tax exemption for
charitable organizations performing similar activities
should not constitute an obstacle to this fundamental
principle.” [47] More broadly, proposals to “improve”
the legislative framework are generally going toward
more permissibility. For Oberson for example, an
increase in recovery rates is warranted because
“values have been shifting and the Swiss society is
readier [than before] to accept an increase in
recovery rates.”[48] The widespread interest of
citizens and politicians in philanthropic actions would
have resulted   in   the   sector's growth, and it would
justify an increase in exemption rates.
 
Finally, pertaining to Parliament, while Swiss Law on
foundations has not changed since the revision,
[which entered into force on January 1st, 2006,
following the parliamentary initiative known as
Schiesser (00.461) filed on December 14th, 2000]
calls for reform of this Law and the improvement of
framework conditions has not ceased since.
Reference can be made to Werner Luginbühl’s
motion (09.3344) introduced in March 2009 and
made with the objective to “strengthen Switzerland’s
attractiveness as a prime location for foundations”
and another parliamentary initiative from the same
member “to strengthen Switzerland’s attractiveness
for  foundations” (14.470) filed on December 9th,
2014.
 
We define these three interventions [49] by the fact
that they do not question public “purposes,” or the
type of field or actions recognized as being of public
interest [and it may lead to exoneration for
organizations and a tax break for donors] but tend to
introduce more flexibility to the rules governing the
organization and running of legal entities recognized
to be of public utility. The Schiesser initiative thus
led to an increase in legal persons or activities that
could be recognized as of  public utility and are
entitled to tax-deductible donations.  . It led to a
change concerning maximum taxable income (or net
revenue) that could be exempt from taxes -  the
effective rate moving from 10 to 20 % on a federal
level. The initiative also led to the questioning of the
principle of the permanence of a private foundation's
legal status.  Finally, it obtained a change in the
amendment of the criteria distinguishing donations
from sponsorship, under the terms of the VAT Act, so
that increasing donor visibility      did not correspond
to a loss in tax mean a loss in   tax  exemption  due   to
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the presence of a certain form of 'compensation'.
Luginbühl’s interventions (09.3442 et 14.470) point
in the same direction when, without giving numbers,
they demand that “public and family foundations
should be given a tax system as attractive as the one
they benefit from in neighboring countries,” but also
the possibility to increase this deductible portion in
certain circumstances. These requests can take on a
more technical form, such as the possibility to vary
the rate depending on a  donation's temporality or
purpose. During Luginbühl’s last intervention
(14.470), he proposed the establishment of a
favorable tax regime concerning bounties allocated
to heirs at the beginning of the inheritance by giving
them an increase in income tax threshold
deductibility regarding donations following the year
of death, or the year of partition of an estate, as well
as the possibility to defer a donation to future tax
periods, if the maximum allowable claim for
charitable donation is exceeded.
 
Justifications for such amendments are two-fold. On
the one hand, it would be necessary to increase the
funds for public interest purposes in a context where
the State, on its own, may not be able to achieve all
social policies deemed necessary. Schiesser thus
finds, to support his bill on Charitable Donations Tax,
that the State is requested for a growing number of
tasks but has limited financial resources to complete
them all. (…) It is barely possible to find new financial
resources (…). We also know that we have seen
substantial personal fortunes be built up and some of
their holders would be very willing to invest a fair
amount to public benefit tasks that are still to this
day financed solely by the State. However,
Foundation  Law and modernized tax laws should
urge them to act in this way as  is the case
elsewhere!” On the other hand, it would be to show
good face in comparison to legislations existing in
other countries, specifically neighboring ones. As
Schiesser wrote during his parliamentary initiative,
referring to  his proposal to open the possibility of
amending a  foundation's objectives, “Austrians have
introduced a similar provision on the Law of private
foundations; since then, the number of these latter
have skyrocketed; the provision in question might
not be completely foreign.” Luginbühl also  mentions
in   his    motion   the   question   of   international  tax
competition: “In these changing circumstances of
financial policy and the real economy, the Federal
Council is responsible for maintaining Switzerland’s
attractiveness for domestic and foreign foundations
and for their founders. To that end, we call upon the
Council  to make adjustments and establish
cooperation following new developments in Europe.”
However, there is no discussion on tax justice or its
distortion.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political authorities demonstrate resistance to tax law
evolution for donations
 
In reading the replies from the government to the
different questions from Parliamentarians, we can
see that there is a strong will for maintaining and
defending the status quo. Although as previously
stated, legislation has evolved since the 2000s.
While in general concerned to promote State-
approved legal persons considered as a public utility,
public authorities put in mind how important it is to
maintain a restrictive interpretation of public utility,
of legal persons or activities enjoying tax benefits;
otherwise, we risk distorting fair taxation. Thus, with
the requests for an increase from shares in income
(or profits) that could be deducted for tax purposes if
given to organizations of public utility, the
authorities reiterate  [50] “that the economic
capacity principle materializes the constitutional
principle of equal treatment with the level of
taxation. So, within the comprehensive taxation
system of net income, this principle places the
legislator under the obligation to tax people that
actually obtain an income according to their financial
capacity.” The increase in tax deduction appears
“contrary to the principle of taxation depending on
taxpaying  ability” ;   for  them,    “a  wealthy  taxpayer
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We also know that we have seen
substantial personal fortunes be
built  up and some of their holders
would be very willing to invest a
fair amount to public benefit...
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giving donations to a foundation can indeed lower his
global tax burden to the level of a taxpayer with a
much more modest financial situation. In addition,
such deductions would lead to favor taxpayers
subject to high marginal tax rates at the expense of
those with lower income  levels.” To conclude, he
stated that “the person granting a donation is not
constrained in their economic capacity; on the
contrary, this donation is the very expression of their
capacity.”
 
Similarly, in response to the Luginbühl motion
(09.3344), the Federal Council opposes the
possibility to defer a donation to future periods to
benefit from tax exemption on a total sum that
otherwise would exceed the maximum allowable
claim. For the Federal Council, “we must refuse the
possibility of deferring a donation because it would
lead to an unequal treatment in comparison to other
deductions (…), it would complicate the tax system,
and would lead to a significant amount of extra
administrative workload for tax authorities.” Another
unfortunate consequence of deferred donations
would be that “it would not be easily understood by
all taxpayers.” It is also worth noting that even if the
arguments are varied (tax justice, concern to avoid
making the tax system more complicated in its
administrative organization, and for the sake of the
tax system’s readability for citizens), the tax
incentives issue as a public policy tool (in comparison
with other public policy tool such as direct expenses)
is either not or very rarely being called into question.
The only time where it appears, in response to the
Schiesser’s initiative, it is never to question the
possible deletion of this tool but rather to justify not
excessively increasing the benefits for donors.
 
Disconnected  proposals
 
There seems to be a significant discrepancy between
the debates within the political actors that we just
mentioned, and the concerns of the authors, who
proposed several reforms and are calling into
question tax exemption incentives to foster public
interest purposes. Where parliamentarians, lawyers
and interest groups are proposing to increase
incentives for donors as well as public interest
organizations, and where public authorities seem to
defend a status  quo,   the  different  authors   instead
suggest a limitation of these tax incentives.
 
First, from an administrative perspective, the issue of
excessive administrative burdens created by tax
deductions is raised by Peters [51]. Establishing that
the policy supporting the tax incentive policy about
donations for public utility or set for a public
purpose, concerns 70% of taxpayers for an average
amount donated of 660 francs, it is safe to question
its relevance considering the workload it causes.
Raising the question of the system of tax deductions’
complexity for the taxpayers and the significant
administrative burden caused by the recording and
the audit of the tax-deductible amounts for tax
authorities, he offers two simplification measures.
One possibility would be the abolition of deductions.
If the tax loss caused by tax exemptions for
charitable donations for the Confederation
represents 1.84% of the direct federal tax (DFT), why
wouldn’t we remove this exemption and lower the
income tax rate threshold accordingly, or on the
contrary, raise equivalently the number of direct
programs for objectives pursued by this
exemption? [52]
[03] Dossier Spécial | Special Feature
L'Année PhiLanthropique - The PhiLanthropic Year                                                                                                          Volume 1 - Avril | April 2019
...the tax incentives issue as
a public policy tool (in
comparison with other
public policy tool such as
direct expenses) is either not
or very rarely being called
into question.
Another solution would be to grant flat-rate
deductions on personal income instead of the
existing tax deduction by calculating the standard
values that could be attributed instead of the current
figure, without affecting the Confederation’s total tax
receipts. Assuming that the taxpayers’ level and
income structure remain the same, Peters  [53]
proposes the sum of 950 CHF if only
rightful  beneficiaries only (namely those who
currently use the deduction) are taken into account,
or the amount of 740 CHF for each taxpayer if this
flat-rate deduction was granted to all taxpayers,
whether or not they currently use the deduction.
 
Beyond the issue of the administrative cost of
exemption management, the authors are trying to
answer to the question of tax justic, showing the
unequal character of the tax exemption system for
public benefit organizations. Since the aid granted is
directly linked to the organizations’ financial means
(particularly wealthy), Niggly  [54], proposed  60
years ago that the State collect taxes from all
financial institutions and then redistribute them in
the form of grants. For him, this tax exemption waiver
in favour of an enlargement of subsidies would lead
to economic aid, with grants being prioritized
according to the  respective merits of organizations
and not based on their financial capacity. For his
part, McDaniel proposes to limit the injustice by
replacing the deduction by a tax credit to
be  considered as an income in and of itself. And as
such should appear on your income tax return: “For
example, if a tax credit of 100 dollars is granted, it
must be included in the income declaration in year
N+1. Thus, a taxpayer earning an income in the 20%
tax rate, would pay 20 dollars of taxes on his tax
credit and would gain an 80 dollar advantage on the
tax grant after taxes. A taxpayer of the 15% tax rate,
on the other hand, would only pay 15$ on his tax
credit and would gain an 85 dollar advantage after
taxes. The tax grant would then be progressive
according to income.” [55]
 
In the same vein, Thaler  [56], 2017 Nobel prize
winner in Economy, and Reich  [57] also propose a
system change in favour of a  tax credit based on a
single rate and for capped amounts. Starting with the
premise that it is difficult to justify subsidizing
donations from the wealthy more than those from
the poor. Thaler explains that the unjust mechanism
of tax deduction is based on an unfortunate analogy
with businesses: “We are doing it because our tax
system regards donations as “deductions” from
income. We subtract it from income and pay taxes on
the remainder. This way of proceeding is logical in
the case of business expenses. Someone who owns a
company must pay taxes only on benefits, not on
income. However, it does not apply to charitable tax
deductions as they do not represent a cost to
business". [58] Hence, he proposes that the tax
subsidy rates be the same for everybody. Therefore,
this means that instead of being a tax deduction from
income, the subsidy can be claimed as a tax credit,
which ideally would be “refundable,” thus payable
even if the tax bill is negative or equal to zero. For
Reich, this tax credit should be capped: “By offering
an equivalent tax credit to all donors (let’s say 25%
of every donation), with the tax credit being capped
at a certain level (let’s say 1,000 dollars), the
mechanism avoids inverted allowance structure,
offers an equal credit to all donors, and of course,
does nothing to hinder donors’ freedom to continue
donating money after reaching the ceiling, but with
no state subsidy to do so.” [59] Finally, Cagé  [60]
proposes a radical solution to encourage
participation by all for supporting organizations of
public utility without resorting to the distribution of
tax benefits. She also reflected on inequalities linked
to tax deductions but was concerned with
strengthening civil society by  supporting
institutionalization   and   daily   operation   of    public
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administrative cost of the
exemption management, the
authors are trying to answer
to the question of tax justice
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benefit organizations; she suggests
exiting  the  system of tax deduction entirely but to
allow each taxpayer through their income   tax
 return  to choose to which organization they wish to
directly allocate a predefined amount of their taxes,
which would be identical for each taxpayer, be it
taxed or not.
 
What would happen if the solution she suggests was
applied in Switzerland? If we divide the uncollected
revenue by the Confederation through tax
deductions applied to direct federal tax (DFT) (180
million according to Peters’  [61] estimates, by the 5
million taxpayers), we get a total of 36 CHF which
represents the tax share each taxpayer could decide
to allocate freely to an organization of public utility
of its choosing. It would be cost-neutral for the
Confederation; the 180 million in tax loss would
continue to be invested in organizations of public
utility. The selection of organizations supported
would be ascribed to all citizens rather than the
wealthiest taxpayers, or of the Parliament alone.
 
 
Bringing to light the political science and economics
literature, coupled with political interventions linked
with the question of tax incentives favoring
donations or organizations of public utility, reveals
the irreconcilable contradictions between the
debates taking place in these different fields.
 
Hypotheses that would explain the discrepancies
between the problems that retain the attention
of  academics and those that interest lawyers, 
interest     groups     and     politicians      are   plentiful,
This  could be due to the technical nature of the
subject, the question of tax incentives often being
seen as legal rather political. The fact that the
subject remains in the margins of the political
agenda and no party has yet to take a strong position
on these questions can also be part of the
explanation. Or it is because in terms of tax
exemptions, those on donations are only one of the
99 exemptions possible for taxes managed by the
FTA [62] and only concerns a small proportion of the
budget allocated to the Confederation, representing
a total lower than 2% in tax revenues linked to the
Direct Federal Tax   (DFT) [63].     The lack of more
accurate data regarding the amounts which these tax
exemptions represent [reminder that the only known
figures concern the FTA of natural persons] helps in
no way.
 
It is perhaps first and foremost because talking about
charity or philanthropy makes the debate a bit
difficult. These notions seem to be too morally
charged for it to be possible to easily weigh the pros
and cons. As Bernholz et al. ironically write in their
work dedicated to a moral and political limit of
philanthropy, “if philanthropy is a positive thing, a
precious moral behavior, a righteous character - then
the more, the better. Philanthropy should be
everywhere!”  [64]. In fact, how does one oppose a
phenomenon that is viewed so positively? If we do
not undertake, beforehand, research on
philanthropy’s political dimension [65], or a reflexion
on the injustices concerning tax incentives which
begs the question of the validity of their
existence[3], this indeed seems difficult.
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Conclusion
It is perhaps first and foremost
because talking about charity
or philanthropy makes the
debate a bit difficult.
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